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Introduction
Credit plays a central role in propelling fishing and allied 
activities in developing economies. Fishers’ dependence 
on credit to meet their operational and capital investment 
requirements have been ever-growing due to the increasing 
adoption of capital-intensive techniques in fishing. As in 
several other coastal economies, Kerala’s marine fisheries 
sector accommodates distinct financial market systems with 
multifarious financial intermediaries, involved in diverse but 
regular credit-based economic transactions. There has been 
a steady growth in institutional financing of Kerala’s marine 
fisheries over the past three to four decades, under the 
umbrella of the co-operative sector. The coverage of formal 
banking in the coastal belts has also undergone notable 
improvements during this period. Despite this, recent studies 
have shown the obstinate presence of informal financial 
institutions that wield significant economic-power among 
fishing communities in Kerala. Several reasons have been 
pointed out, that mainly include (i) the reluctance of the 
institutional agencies, including that of the co-operative 
sector, to risk their loanable funds beyond certain limits, 
given the inability of the fishers to offer entitlements other 
than a share of their harvest and (ii) the ‘Banker on the 
Beach’ advantage enjoyed by the informal sector. Further, 
the informal credit system has evolved over the years, mainly 
by virtue of changes in ownership pattern of factors of 
production, investment requirements and the wider socio-
economic fabric of the fisher folk community. Against this 
backdrop, this article discusses the broad categories of 
credit sources in Kerala’s fishery sector, their inter-linkages, 
the main actors involved and their general features. Further, 
the results obtained from a primary survey is discussed to 
throw light on the fishers’ predominant borrowing practices, 
types of credit contracts, the conditions of borrowing and 
repayment as well as the costs associated with certain 
predominant modes of borrowing. Various constraints in 
the way of financial inclusion are deliberated upon, and 
policy perspectives to circumvent them are discussed.
Fishery credit market in Kerala: 
An overview
Formal sector
The formal financial sector in Kerala’s coastal arena includes 
the scheduled commercial banks such as public sector 
banks, private banks and regional rural banks (RRBs) as 
well as the cooperative banking institutions and societies. 
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The banking sector presently comprises of 43 commercial 
banks, one Regional Rural Bank (Kerala Gramin Bank), 
Kerala State Co-operative Bank with 14 affiliated District 
Co-operative Banks (DCBs), 1638 Primary Agriculture Co-
operative Societies (PACS) and the Kerala State Agriculture 
and Rural Development Banks (PCARDBs). Besides these, 
the Kerala State Co-operative Federation for Fisheries 
Development Ltd. (Matsyafed) deals with diverse credit 
delivery services. The South Indian Federation of Fishermen 
Societies (SIFFS) is another non-governmental entity that 
provides a variety of services including small-scale credit 
to the artisanal fishermen. The National Marine Fisheries 
Census, 2010 reported a total of 289 bank branches and 
276 fishery co-operative societies in the marine fishing 
villages of Kerala that to the financial requirements of fisher 
folk. Though bank lending has increased, both in terms 
of actual quantity of money disbursed and as a share of 
fisheries in priority sector lending, it is worth noting that 
the latter accounts to be less than one percent.
Matsyafed presently operates with a two-tier co-operative 
institutional framework with the apex body at the state 
level and the fishermen co-operative societies at the 
primary level. It has strategically placed itself in a unique 
position so as to meet the distinctive credit requirements 
of the fishing community in the best possible way, by 
abating the rigidities of the banking sector. Every loan 
granted by the Matsyafed Societies has a commission 
component and an interest component. Commission 
generally includes the charges towards the services, 
including auctioning, rendered by Matsyafed through 
its primary societies, as well as the mandated savings for 
the debtor fisher. Interest is a fixed charge decided at 
the time of disbursal of the loan. This is operationalised 
through designated auctioneers, who are empowered 
to auction fishers’ harvests on behalf of Matsyafed 
Societies. They collect commissions as a percentage of 
gross value of catch per-trip. On getting good catches, 
a part of the proceeds (generally 40%) are deducted, 
which is subsequently apportioned between principal 
and interest. Such apportioning is made by the societies 
on a flexible basis considering the outstanding credit 
amount. The savings part collected is returned to the 
fishers as lump sum during festivals as bonus payments. 
The system in a way mimics the strategy of the informal 
lenders/auctioneers who accept a share of the fishers’ 
harvest towards loan repayment.
Though a minority, certain non-banking financial entities 
also finance fishermen. These are financial companies 
registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and are 
engaged in providing loans and advances, acquisition of 
shares, stocks, bonds, hire-purchase, insurance business 
or chit business adhering to the rules and regulations 
of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Companies lending 
money against gold as collateral security are a dominant 
category under this, with interest rates generally higher 
than the banking institutions.
Informal credit sources
Among the many informal credit choices, the output/
market-tying credit contract is the dominant one in 
the study area. This is typically characterized by inter-
linked deals wherein, the commission agent/auctioneer 
creditor enters into an output-tying contract with 
vessel-owner fishers who are in need of credit. Here, 
the beneficiary fisherman obtains credit on condition 
that the future catches from his vessels are marketed 
through the commission agent/auctioneer at an agreed 
upon rate of commission. It is interesting to note that 
the commissions are based only on the daily catch 
volumes, and has no correlation whatsoever to the 
amount of outstanding debt. As long as a debtor 
fisherman has an outstanding loan, he is bound by 
the contract not only to continue selling their catches 
through the creditor-auctioneer, but also to pay the 
due commission per catch. The loanee fishermen are 
supposed to repay part of their outstanding loan in lump 
sum on getting good catches, so that the creditors can 
restore their capital on a regular basis. However, the 
creditors generally discourage complete closure of a 
loan, as it means loss of a steady stream of commission 
for them. The contracts are unwritten, legally untenable 
and are purely based on mutual trust and reciprocal 
dependence between the parties involved.
Third-party share is another common mode through which 
the fishers raise funds for capital expenditure or other 
unforeseen expenditures like repairs and maintenance 
works. These are shares disbursed generally to people 
outside the fishing community or to businessmen in the 
locality interested in investing in fishing business. Unlike 
the primary shareholders of a fishing vessel, who are 
active fishermen themselves, the third-party shareholders 
generally stay detached from routine fishing activities. 
The interest is paid in the form of share of harvest 
revenues accrued from routine fishing. The value of a 
share on a fishing vessel is generally fixed rather arbitrarily 
by the primary share holders, but is strongly linked to 
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the economic performance of the vessel in question, 
experience of the skipper and general reputation of 
the shareholders as well as the crew. Third-party share 
is understood to be a relatively new practice that has 
emerged in the wake of financial prosperity attained 
by rural and coastal dwellers of Kerala through foreign 
remittances over the past two decades.
The loans obtained from private money lenders involve 
predetermined interest charges payable at definite intervals. 
Though interest payments are collected on regular intervals 
without fail, such obstinacy is not shown in collecting 
repayments to the principal. The loans may involve collateral 
security such as land titles, jewellery or promissory notes. 
However, money lenders do not always insist on collateral 
security, but follow their own compulsive means to enforce 
interest payments and principal repayments. Factors such 
as urgency in fund requirements and quick access with 
minimal procedural formalities make them much sought 
after entities within fishing communities.
Other than the above mentioned informal loans, 
fishermen also resort to reciprocal loans, which are 
one-to-one interest-free financial transactions between 
fellow fishermen based on a triadic relationship. 
The triadic relationship between the debtor, the 
creditor and the community at large ensures that the 
parties involved are insured against extreme financial 
distress at any point in time through mutually enforced 
transaction systems.
Borrowing pattern and credit 
contract conditions
This section presents the borrowing pattern of Kerala 
fishermen as revealed based on a primary survey 
conducted by ICAR - CMFRI in 2017 in 8 maritime 
districts covering 137 inboard ring seine units. Table 1 
provides estimates of average borrowing by fishermen 
from various formal and informal lending sources. 
Average credit outstanding was found to be generally 
higher among informal sources compared to the formal. 
The annual interest rate on loans varied between 11-15 
per cent in case of commercial banks, between 11-14 
per cent in co-operative banks and 4 -13 per cent in 
Matsyafed. Non-banking entities were found to charge 
an interest rate between 18 - 20 per cent as observed 
from the three cases in the sample. The auctioneers and 
third-party share-holders did not charge any interest 
rates as noted earlier. However, the rates on loans 
advanced by private money lenders were quite high 
falling in the range of 24-60 per cent on an annual 
basis; with lenders actually specifying the rates on a 
monthly basis. Commissions on harvest proceeds are 
charged by auctioneers (4-10%) and Matsyafed (3-6%). 
Quite obviously, the rates of commission charged by 
auctioneers were higher compared to Matsyafed in most 
of the cases. Loan term is another important factor 
that determines the demand for loans across sources. 
Hundred per cent of loans advanced by commercial banks, 
co-operative banks and non-banking entities required 
a repayment within 2-7 years. About 97 per cent of 
the loans given by Matsyafed also fall in this category. 
In contrast, none of the loans from informal sources 
are time-bound. Scrutiny of the repayment schedule 
prescribed by various types of lending sources suggests 
that only two types of scheduling is prevalent in the study 
area - either monthly or flexible. While all commercial 
banks and 67 per cent of co-operative banks and non-
banking financial entities followed monthly schedule of 
repayment, the rest followed flexible schedule. In case 
of Matsyafed, 74 per cent of the active loans required 
monthly repayment. Notably, all loans advanced by the 
informal sources are scheduled for flexible repayment 
thereby better suiting the requirement of a clientele like 
fishermen. However, it is worth noting that interest / 
commission payments for these loans were done on 
regular schedule, either monthly or as per availability 
of catches. Any delays or default in such payments 
attracted penalties that varied from case to case.
Costs of loans from auctioneers 
and third-party shares
The actual costs of loan sourced from auctioneers and 
third-party share-holders are not explicitly known as the 
interest payments on them are paid on a per-trip basis 
in the form of auction commission and owners’ share 
of catch revenue respectively. Their annual imputed 
values was estimated based on full set of trip-wise cost 
and earnings information collected from 10 sampling 
units (Table 2). The four units that obtained loans 
from Matsyafed incurred costs varying from 15.1 per 
cent to 38.1 per cent of the loan amount per annum 
in the form of auction commission. In contrast, the 
imputed value of interests on loans from auctioneers 
range from 34.4 per cent to as high as 159.8 per 
cent. It could be seen that, in addition to higher 
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Table 1. Main characteristics of fishery credit contracts by source in Kerala, India
Particulars
Formal credit sources Informal credit sources
Commercial  
banks
Cooperative  
banks
Matsyafed Non-banking  
entities
Auctioneer Private money  
lenders
Third-party  
shares
Friends 
& relatives
Average credit availed 
(million Rs.) 1.22 1.03 1.20 1.03 0.77 1.01 1.19 0.25
Average credit outstanding 
as a share of total (%) 57 73 65 90 96 90 90 80
Annual interest rate (%)
11-15 11-14 4-13 18-20 NA 24-60 NA 0
Commission on harvests (% 
of catch revenue) NA NA 3-6 NA 4-10 NA NA NA
Loan term (%)
 One year or less
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 100
 2-7 years
100 100 97 100 0 0 0 0
 Above 7 years
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
 Unspecified
0 0 0 0 100 100 100 0
Repayment schedule (%)
 Monthly
100 67 74 67 0 0 0 0
 Quarterly/ Semi-annual
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Annual
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Flexible 0 33 26 33 100 100 100 100
Source: Parappurathu et al., 2019
auction commission charged by the auctioneers (2 to 
3 percentage points higher in relation to Matsyafed), 
relatively lower amounts of loans disbursed by them 
push up the interest rates. The imputed value of interest 
on third party shares ranged between 8.8 per cent 
and 45.8 per cent across the units studied, based on 
their relative fishing performance. These are in fact 
the rates of return on equity realized by the concerned 
third-party investors. The above results show that, the 
interest burden incurred by an average fisherman on 
output-tying loans and third-party shares is generally 
much higher compared to those offered by banks and 
other formal financial institutions. Though commission 
payments on Matsyafed loans also go beyond bank 
rates many a times, its co-operative mode of operation 
and quasi-state-ownership nature ensure that a part 
of the commission payments are returned to the 
debtors in the form of their savings and the profits 
are ploughed back to benefit the fishing community 
through multiple channels from time to time.
Constraints in the way of 
financial inclusion
The main factors leading to the continuance of informal 
financing in Kerala, as revealed by the survey include (i) 
strict terms and conditions prescribed for disbursement 
of formal credit; (ii) collateral requirements; (iii) 
procedural complexities; (iv) delays in sanction; (v) 
political interference; (vi) non-flexibility in the schedule 
for repayment; (vii) attachment of collateral property 
in cases of loan defaults; (viii) general aversion of 
fishermen to institutional formalities involved; (ix) 
hesitation on the part of banks to fund fishers due to 
risks involved and (x) lower credit allocation for the 
fisheries sector in general. The main advantage of 
the output-tying credit deals and third-party shares, 
the dominant sources of informal credit, is the non-
essentiality of collateral and the willingness of the 
creditors to accept interest payments as a share of 
harvest. Another attraction is the high level of flexibility 
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Table 2. Estimated imputed interests paid as harvest shares and third-party share payments of selected ring seine units, 2017
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Unit 1 196 5.80 0.43 3.66 1.50 0.64 0 1.00 0.50 (3) 34.4 25.7
Unit 2 133 11.77 0.59 4.63 5.15 2.75 0 0.50 1.50 (6) 47.1 45.8
Unit 3 141 26637 1.33 8.98 13.31 4.34 0 0.50 3.00 (5) 159.8 24.1
Unit 4 110 18072 0.45 7.19 7.88 3.00 3.60 0 1.00 (3) 15.1* 15.5
Unit 5 139 25404 1.02 6.39 14.81 4.20 2.00 0 0 38.1* 0
Unit 6 222 30861 1.54 6.87 16.91 6.98 0 1.50 0 82.3 0
Unit 7 172 18171 0.91 5.93 9.87 2.41 0 1.20 0 60.6 0
Unit 8 101 15921 0.79 4.56 8.63 2.75 0 0.80 0 79.6 0
Unit 9 76 4152 0.17 1.96 0.46 1.36 0.70 0 5.00 (20) 17.8* 8.8
Unit 10 182 14852 1.48# 5.11 8.10 1.64 1.20 0.70 0
37.1*
127.3
0
Notes: Auction commission includes service charges (1-2%). This is deducted before working out the imputed interest rate; *denotes imputed value of 
interest paid to Matsyafed. This does not include the regular interest due, which varies from 4-13% of the loan outstanding; #Covers auction commission 
paid to both Matsyafed and auctioneer; Figures in parentheses show the number of shares allotted to the third-party share holder/s.
Source: Parappurathu et al., 2019 
allowed for repayments to the principal, depending on 
the revenue obtained from routine fishing trips. They 
are also free from other hassles that constrain timely 
availability of credit. Over and above, the fishermen 
fear that in case of bankruptcy due to economic loss 
of fishing units, the formal institutions would proceed 
to attach their collateral property, which in most cases 
would be the only asset at their disposal.
On the contrary in the informal system, a loss making 
vessel operator generally is able to clear his dues by 
selling off his fishing assets (vessel / gear / equipment) 
and sharing the resultant proceeds among his many 
creditors. This is an accepted lenience shown by majority 
of the informal creditors, which also helps the defaulter 
fisherman to take an honorable exit from the debts 
involved. The extensive social networks and information-
base maintained by the creditors within the community 
help to minimize chances of willful defaults, thereby 
maintaining the sanctity of the system.
Notwithstanding the many perceived merits, the output-
tying system cannot be treated as one which is fully 
endorsed by the fishing community. There is widespread 
concern for the implicit exploitation involved. As evident 
from Table 2, the cost of such loans is often exorbitant, 
with interest payments in the form of auction commission 
estimated to be several multiples of the rates charged by 
the formal financial institutions. The biggest demerit of the 
output-tying credit system is that it leaves the fisherman 
an eternal debtor, never actually able to get rid of his 
outstanding loans, and forcefully tied to the perpetual bond 
of commission payments. Similarly, the third-party share 
system also ends up as a debt trap wherein the real owners’ 
share to harvests keeps on narrowing commensurate with 
their third-party dues. Nevertheless, the fishermen consider 
private money lenders as the last resort and approach them 
only when other formal and informal financial sources are 
either exhausted or inaccessible.
Policy options for enhancing 
financial inclusion
A logical solution to the fishermen’s problem of dearth 
of collateral security would be to secure acceptance 
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of borrowers’ fishing vessels as collaterals by the 
lending institutions. The banks generally reject such 
arrangements citing high vulnerability of fishing 
boats to unforeseen risks in the seas. Such risks 
however, can be mitigated to a great extent if the 
vessel in question is insured by a recognized insurance 
company. An insured vessel would be free from the 
risks of monetary loss in case of accidents and hence 
should qualify as a collateral security. The government-
supported Fisheries Mutual Insurance Scheme (FMIS) 
in Japan is a well quoted example for such a system, 
wherein it necessitates financial institutions to extend 
loans against insurance claims of fishers which are 
considered as collaterals. However, the coverage of 
vessel insurance in India is quite limited, exposing 
majority of the vessel owners to high level of risks. In 
this context, if the institutional lending agencies can 
facilitate insurance coverage of vessels they lend and 
simultaneously accept them as a collateral security, the 
twin problems mentioned above could be addressed 
at one go. Due to non-essentiality of any immovable 
collateral security under such an arrangement, the 
fishermen should find it as an option worthy of trial. 
To make things easier, the lending banks can tie up 
with insurance companies to smoothen the transition. 
As a result, if the enrollments to vessel insurance 
schemes go up, the premiums would naturally decline, 
further catalyzing the process. The government can 
play a facilitating role by incentivizing the fishermen 
who opt for such schemes and by enforcing adequate 
regulatory mechanisms to minimize misuse of any 
sort. Nonetheless, the outcomes indicated above are 
certainly not easy to realize and would require concerted 
and co-ordinated efforts by multiple stakeholders. 
Moreover, success in this regard would depend on a 
number of factors such as banks’ willingness to try such 
innovative lending models, technological readiness of 
the insurance industry for effective fishery insurance 
administration and the fishermen’s inclination to 
participate in such experiments.
Bringing about flexibility in credit contracts is another 
sensible way of improving financial inclusion. Credits 
cards offer such flexibility whereby the consumers have a 
reasonable amount of freedom in scheduling withdrawals 
and repayments within their credit limits. Considering 
the success of credit cards in agriculture sector (Kisan 
Credit Card) in India and the high demand for incessant 
credit in the fishery sector, introducing credit cards for 
the benefit of fishers seems to be a worthy option. India’s 
union budget 2018-19 has made an allocation in this 
regard which needs to be capitalized for the benefit 
of fishermen. Other than banks, institutions such as 
Matsyafed can also venture in this direction.
Though informal lending agencies serve a role, which cannot 
be understated, in meeting the credit demand of fishermen, 
moral hazards associated with such borrowing often result 
in bankruptcy of fishermen. However, while addressing 
such concerns, a systematic approach towards enhancing 
financial inclusion is necessary, fully acknowledging the role 
played by the informal sector in meeting the much needed 
liquidity requirement of fishers over decades. Bringing 
about reforms in the fish auctioning system by introducing 
electronic/automated auction systems at the landing centres 
with proper state supervision as well as strict monitoring 
of informal lending activities may be explored. Considering 
the alluring role played by fishery cooperatives in advancing 
financial inclusion by far, and their collective bargaining 
potential to achieve some of the above mentioned reforms 
in the days to come, measures to further boost their reach 
and penetration are also called for.
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